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Insider Trading with Different Market Structures
Wassim Daher∗ Fida Karam† Leonard J. Mirman‡
August 15, 2011
Abstract
We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insid-
ers under three different market structures: (i) Cournot competition
among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii)
Monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market.
We show how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by each of the
market structure. Finally we perform a comparative statics analysis
between the models. 1
JEL classification: G14, D82
Keywords: Insider Trading, Cournot , Stackelberg, Correlated signals,
Kyle model
1 Introduction
Insider trading is considered as one of the most notorious methods of stock
fraud, in which an individual involved with a company whose stock is pub-
licly traded, shares or sells information with regard to an event involving
that company. Typically, this information is not only unavailable to the
public, but is also expected to alter the behavior of the company’s stock,
resulting in profit opportunities of illegal nature. Insider trading has had
some landmark incidents or scandals that helped define exactly what it is,
starting with the Chase National Bank case in 1929. Newer scandals can
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also be cited such as the Enron Corporation Case in 2004 and the New
Castle Funds case in 2010. All these scandals reflect the different types of
inside-relationship and outside-connection of corporations.
The recurrence of insider trading scandals has renewed the academic interest
in this topic. Much of the theoretical research has centered on two issues:
the public desire of implementing regulations and laws which prohibit in-
sider trading (Dow and Rahi (2003), Leland (1992), Manove (1989)) and
the dissemination of information that was captured by Kyle (1985) in his
seminal work on insider trading.
The work of Kyle (1985) has constituted the cornerstone for subsequent
works on the informational effect of insider trading. In the Kyle model,
there is an insider who knows the value of the stock and a market maker
who only knows the distribution of the values of the stock, gets information
from the total noisy stock order flow, and sets the stock price in a way that
his expected profits are zero . The main result is that the stock price reveals
half of the inside information, regardless of the parameter values. When
the marker maker is allowed to observe, in addition to the total order flow,
another signal of the value of the asset, like in Jain and Mirman (1999), the
stock price becomes more informative and the insider’s profits decrease with
respect to Kyle (1985).
Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002), Daher and Mirman (2006, 2007), Wang et
al. (2009) and Wang and Wang (2010), then explored, the impact on in-
formation revelation, of various types of speculative markets in the spirit
of Kyle (1985) and Jain and Mirman (1999), by modeling the financial and
real sectors together. The idea behind the introduction of the real sector is
that the insider’s information is due to his participation in the real activ-
ities underlying the financial assets that are the object of insider trading.
In Jain and Mirman (2000), the insider (or trader) is also the manager of
the firm acts as a quantity-setting monopolist in the real sector. Cournot
competition in the real sector is added to this model in Jain and Mirman
(2002). Both papers show that the amount of information incorporated in
the stock price, which is the same in both papers, increases with respect to
Kyle (1985), but is the same as in Jain and Mirman (1999). In other words,
the introduction of the real sector does not affect the amount of information
revealed. However, the insider’s profits are, in both papers, lower than Kyle
(1985). The insider’s profits and his compensation scheme are lower in Jain
and Mirman (2002) with respect to Jain and Mirman (2000), due to Cournot
competition in the real sector.
Daher and Mirman (2006, 2007), Wang et al (2009) and Wang and Wang
(2010) extended Jain and Mirman (2000) and (2002) to include competition
2
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in the financial sector. Indeed, there are different types of insiders in the
firm, some without any managerial responsibilities (the president and the
members of the board of directors, for example), with the objective of max-
imizing their profits from trading the stock of the firm whose inside infor-
mation they possess. Therefore, the competition among insiders is another
form of competition that influence the amount of information disseminated
in the stock price. Daher and Mirman (2006) and (2007) show that Cournot
competition in the financial sector between the owner and the manager in-
creases the amount of information incorporated in the stock price (which is
the same between the two papers) with respect to Jain and Mirman (2000)
and (2002). The profits of the manager sometimes increase and sometimes
decrease, relatively to Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002), depending on the vari-
ances of the exogenous variables. However, the profits of the manager and
the owner are less in the Cournot-real case (Daher and Mirman, 2006) than
in the monopoly-real case (Daher and Mirman, 2007). Wang and Wang
(2010) introduce Stackelberg competition in the real market to the model of
Daher and Mirman (2007) and support the conclusion that competition in
the real sector does not affect the degree of information revelation. In Wang
et al (2009), the manager in the lower ladder of the organizational hierarchy
takes the order from the owner and makes the decisions in the Cournot-real
sector. He acts as a Stackelberg-follower in the financial sector to the owner
who is high on the organizational hierarchy and who knows the manager’s
reaction function. The authors show that Stackelberg competition in the fi-
nancial sector increases the amount of information revealed and the owner’s
profits, in comparison with Daher and Mirman (2006). The manager’s prof-
its may decrease or increase depending on the exogenous parameters of the
model.
In this paper, we offer an in-depth study to the effect of the financial market
structure on the revelation of information. We start by a natural extension
of Jain and Mirman (1999) to include Cournot duopoly in the financial
market (Model I). We find that each insider looses the market power and
partially controls the stock price. Hence, the stock price reveals more infor-
mation with respect to Jain and Mirman (1999). The unconditional profits
of each insider also decreases. Those results are similar to Daher and Mir-
man (2007), when compared to Jain and Mirman (2000). We then try to
add a little more reality to Model I, and assume that one of the insiders,
the owner, is high in the organizational hierarchy and chooses the second
insider, the manager, to serve his purpose. In other words, we model Stack-
elberg competition in the financial market, where the owner is the leader and
knows the reaction function of the manager. This type of financial informa-
tion asymmetry between the owner and the manager is widely observed in
real life. We show that with Stackelberg competition in the financial market
(Model II), the manager trades less and hence earns less than in the Cournot
3
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case. However, the owner, due to her role as leader, trades more than in the
Cournot and earns more profits. We also notice that the price reveals more
information in the Stackelberg than in Cournot structure. We finally take
into consideration the real activities of the firm whose stock is traded and
assume that the owner, who acts as a leader in the financial model, does not
have any managerial responsibilities. Instead, the manager who acts as a
follower in the financial market is a quantity-setting monopolist in the real
market (Model III). We show that the introduction of the real market does
not affect the amount of information revealed with respect to Model II. The
same result holds in Jain and Mirman (2000), when compared to Jain and
Mirman (1999).
The paper is structured as follows: in Sections 2, 3 and 4, we present re-
spectively Model I, II and III with their comparative statics. In Section 5,
we conclude.
2 Model I : The Cournot Case
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, all the random variables are defined with
respect to this probability space. In this model we introduce Cournot com-
petition between two insiders into the model of Jain and Mirman (1999).2
Consider an economy with one financial asset, the stock of the firm. There
are three types of agents trading in the financial market. First, there are two
risk-neutral rational traders who know the realization z of z˜, the value of
the stock. Second, there are (non-rational) noise traders, representing small
investors with no information on z. The aggregate noise trade is assumed to
be a random variable u˜, which is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2u. Finally, there are K(K ≥ 2) risk-neutral market makers who
act like Bertrand competitors.
We assume, as in Jain and Mirman (1999), that the market makers observe
two signals, a noisy signal about the value of the firm, denoted by q˜ = z˜+ ε˜,
where ε˜ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ε , and the
total order flow signal. We assume that z˜, u˜ and ε˜ are pairwise independent.
Following Kyle (1985), the trading mechanism is organized in two steps.
In step one, a linear pricing rule and optimal order rule are determined
by the market makers and the insiders, respectively, as a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. The market makers determine a (linear) pricing rule p, based
on their a priori beliefs, where p is a measurable function p : R× R −→ R.
Each insider i(i = 1, 2) chooses a stock trade function x˜i = xi(z˜), where
2It should be pointed out that the results can be automatically generalized to n insiders,
but for the sake of comparison we restrict our attention to the two-insiders case.
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xi : R −→ R is a measurable function. In the second step,3 the insiders
observe the realization z of z˜, and submit their stock order to the market
makers based on the equilibrium stock trade functions. The market makers
also receive orders from the noise traders, all these orders arrive as a total
order flow signal r˜ =
∑
i xi(z˜) + u˜. The two signals are used by the market
makers to set the price p˜ = p(q˜, r˜), based on the equilibrium price function,
to clear the market. The insiders know only the realization z of z˜ and does
not know the values of u˜, ε˜, r˜, z˜ + ε˜ before the order flow decisions is made.
Moreover, each market maker does not know the realization z of z˜ but only
knows its distribution. Finally, the market makers cannot observe either
xi, u or ε.
This is a game of incomplete information because the market makers, unlike
the insider, do not know the realization of z˜. Hence, we seek a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a vector of three functions
[x1(.), x2(.), p(., .)] such that:
(a) Profit maximization of insider i,
E(z˜ − p(z˜ + ε˜, x˜i + x˜−i + u˜))x˜i ≥ E(z˜ − p(z˜ + ε˜, x˜′i + x˜−i + u˜))x˜′i (1)
for any level of trading order x˜′i decided by the insider i and x˜−i is the
trading order of the other insider ;
(b) Semi-Strong Market Efficiency: The pricing rule p(., .) satisfies,
p(q˜, r˜) = E[z˜|q˜, r˜]. (2)
An equilibrium is linear if there exists constants µ0, µ1, µ2 such that,
∀q, r, p(q, r) = µ0 + µ1q + µ2r. (3)
Note that Condition (1) defines the optimal strategies of the two insiders
while Condition (2) guarantees the zero expected profits for the market mak-
ers. The stock price, set by the market makers, is equal to the conditional
expectation of the asset given the available information. We restrict our
study to linear equilibrium. The normal distributions of the exogenous ran-
dom variables, together with the particular expression of the demand, enable
us to derive and to prove the existence of a unique linear equilibrium. Next
in Proposition 1, we characterize the unique linear equilibrium.
3Random variables are denoted with a tilde. Realized values lack the tilde. The mean
of the random variable is denoted with bar.
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Proposition 1 In the insider trading Cournot model with two signals, a
linear equilibrium exists and is unique. It is characterized by
x˜1 = x˜2 =
(1− µ1)(z˜ − z¯)
3µ2
(4)
µ0 = (1− µ1)z¯, µ1 = σ
2
z
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
, µ2 =
√
2σ2εσz
σu(σ2z + 3σ
2
ε)
(5)
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z (6)
and
pii(z˜) =
σuσ
2
ε(z˜ − z¯)2√
2σz(σ2z + 3σ
2
ε)
i = 1, 2 (7)
Proof: See Appendix A
Discussion of the equilibrium In this model we extend the Jain and
Mirman (1999) model with one insider (monopoly) and two signals to the
case of two insiders (Cournot) and two signals. The strategic competition
between the two insiders alters the equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, Lemma
1 whose proof is omitted, shows that on the one hand, Cournot competition
in the financial market decreases the trades of each of the insiders as well as
their conditional profits. On the other hand, Cournot competition increases
the total order flow and therefore increases the amount of information re-
vealed by the stock price. In the process, the price function coefficients are
also affected by Cournot competition. Formally,
Lemma 1 The effects of Cournot competition on the equilibrium outcomes
relative to the monopoly case are given by,4
µ0 > µ
JM
0 µ1 < µ
JM
1 x˜i < x˜
JM pii < pi
JM ∀ i = 1, 2 (8)
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) < V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)JM (9)
µ2 < µ
JM
2 if σ
2
z <
3− 2√2√
2− 1 σ
2
ε and µ2 > µ
JM
2 otherwise (10)
Before analyzing the results, let us highlight the relationship between the
present model and the existing models. As noted, our model adds a second
insider to Jain and Mirman (1999) and hence we study the effect of Cournot
4The superscript JM refers to Jain and Mirman (1999).
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competition in the financial market. Daher and Mirman (2007) also stud-
ied Cournot competition in the financial market with respect to Jain and
Mirman (2000), but both of these models incorporate decisions made in the
real sector and therefor both models have two signals. Finally, Tighe (1989)
and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) studied the Cournot extension of
the Kyle model with only one signal the total order flow.
First note, adding another insider to Jain and Mirman (1999), decreases each
the insider’s trades and thus their conditional profits. But the total insider
trade is increased as are the total profits. Moreover, this result also occurs in
Daher and Mirman (2007) as compared to Jain and Mirman (2000), in both
of these models, real decisions are endogenous. Moreover, Tighe (1989) and
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) obtained the same result when they in-
troduced Cournot competition between the insiders to the monopoly model
of Kyle (1985) where the market maker observes only the total order flow
signal.
Second, strategic competition among the insiders has a direct effect on in-
formation revelation. Indeed, with two insiders the stock price conveys more
information than in the case of a single insider. Indeed, the expressions of
the conditional variances measuring the amount of information revealed in
the stock price in Jain and Mirman (1999) and in our model are:
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)JM = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
σ2z and V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) =
σ2ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z
The key difference between these two conditional variances is the coefficient
of σ2ε in the denominator. The greater the value of this coefficient, the
more the amount of information revealed in the stock price. The origin of
this value is the aggregate orders of the insiders. The aggregate order in
the Cournot case is greater than in Jain and Mirman (1999). 5 It should
be pointed out that with additional real market structure together with
Cournot competition among the insiders, Daher and Mirman (2007) showed
that the stock price reveals more information than in the monopoly case
studied in Jain and Mirman (2000), also with additional real market struc-
ture. Moreover, with only one signal ( the total order flow) Tighe (1989)
and Holden-Subrahmanyam (1992) found that under Cournot competition
among the insiders, the stock price reveals more information than in the
monopoly case studied by Kyle (1985).
Third, Cournot competition in the financial market alters the price function
coefficients. In the presence of Cournot competition among the insiders and
when the market maker observes zero value for both signals, he still receives
5x˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 =
√
2σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯) x˜JM = σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯)
7
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more information than in the monopoly case (µ0 > µ
JM
0 ). On the other
hand, the response µ1 of the market maker to the noisy signal is lower in
this model than in Jain and Mirman (1999). In order to understand this
result recall the expression of µ1 in Jain and Mirman (1999) and in our
model, i.e.
µJM1 =
σ2z
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
and µ1 =
σ2z
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
which depends on the value of the firm, the noisy signal and the total or-
der flow (through the coefficient of σ2ε). Hence, as the number of insiders
increases, the total order flow increases. Thus the coefficient of the noise in
the denominator increases which lowers the value of µ1. This result reflects
the fact that with two insiders there is more information in the order flow
signal which gets more weights, and thus makes the value of µ1 lower than
in Jain and Mirman (1999).
Finally, the coefficient of the total order flow signal µ2 is affected by the rela-
tionship between the exogenous variances σ2z and σ
2
ε . When the noise signal
is too noisy, i.e. when σ2ε is large relative to σ
2
z , the market maker can not
extract information from the noise signal and thus the model resembles to
the Kyle type models with one signal, in which the market depth measure
(the coefficient of the total order flow signal) decreases as the number of
insiders increases (see Tighe (1989)). However, when the noise signal trans-
mits valuable information to the market maker, (when σ2ε is not relatively
large with respect to σ2z) together with the zero expected profit condition,
the value of the total order flow coefficient increases with respect to the
monopoly case.6
3 Model II : The Stackelberg Case
In this model we introduce Stackelberg competition among the two insid-
ers in the financial market. Specifically, we assume that one of insiders,
the owner, is high on the organizational hierarchy and acts as a Stackel-
berg leader in the financial market. The second insider, the manager, is in
the lower ladder of the organizational hierarchy and acts as a Stackelberg-
follower in the financial sector to the owner who knows his reaction function
before making any decision. Proposition 2 characterizes the unique linear
equilibrium. Formally,
Proposition 2 In the Stackelberg financial model with two correlated sig-
nals, a linear equilibrium exists and is unique. It is characterized by
6For more details, see Daher and Mirman (2006), the discussion after Lemma 3, p.
540-541.
8
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.56
x˜1 =
(1− µ1)(z˜ − z¯)
4µ2
, x˜2 =
(1− µ1)(z˜ − z¯)
2µ2
(11)
µ0 = (1− µ1)z¯, µ1 = σ
2
z
σ2z + 4σ
2
ε
, µ2 =
√
3σ2εσz
σu(σ2z + 4σ
2
ε)
(12)
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 4σ
2
ε
σ2z (13)
pi1(z˜) =
σuσ
2
ε(z˜ − z¯)2√
3σz(σ2z + 4σ
2
ε)
, pi2(z˜) =
2σuσ
2
ε(z˜ − z¯)2√
3σz(σ2z + 4σ
2
ε)
(14)
Proof: See Appendix B
In this model, we study the effects of Stackelberg competition in the finan-
cial market on the equilibrium outcomes. Wang et al. (2009) were also
interested by Stackelberg competition among the two insiders but with the
presence of Cournot competition in the real market.
Extending Jain and Mirman (1999) (monopoly) to the Stackelberg case has
two effects. On the one hand, it enables us to study the effect of Stackelberg
competition between the insiders as compared to the Cournot case studied
in the first model of this paper. On the other hand, it allows us to perform
a comparative static analysis with the Kyle-type models when Stackelberg
structure is adopted.
It is well known in industrial organization theory that in the presence of
Stackelberg competition, the leader produces more than in Cournot and
thus makes more profits. The follower produces a lower quantity than in
Cournot and earns less.7 Lemma 3 provides a complete comparative static
analysis between the Cournot competition model ( the model I presented in
the previous section) and the present model. It shows that the leader (the
owner) trades more and earns greater profits than in the Cournot setting and
that the follower (the manager) trades less and makes lower profits. More-
over, Stackelberg competition increases the amount of information revealed
in the stock price. Finally, the stock price coefficients are also affected by
Stackelberg competition. Formally
Lemma 2 The effects of Stackelberg competition on the equilibrium out-
comes, compared to the Cournot-duopoly case are given by, 8
x˜1 < x˜
M1
1 , pi1 < pi
M1
1 , x˜2 > x˜
M1
2 , pi2 > pi
M1
2 (15)
7For more details, see Julien (2011).
8The superscript M1 refers to Model I.
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.56
x˜1 + x˜2 > x˜
M1
1 + x˜
M1
2 , pi1 + pi2 > pi
M1
1 + pi
M1
2 (16)
µ0 > µ
M1
0 , µ1 < µ
M1
1 , V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) < V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)M1 (17)
µ2 < µ
M1
2 if σ
2
z <
4
√
2− 3√3√
3−√2 σ
2
ε and µ2 > µ
M1
2 otherwise (18)
First, Stackelberg competition between the two insiders reduces the man-
ager’s trades and thus conditional profits decrease with respect to the Cournot
case. However, the owner, due to his role as a leader, trades more than in
the Cournot case and earns more. Moreover, the total trade of the insiders
as well as the total insiders’ conditional profits are greater in Stackelberg
than in Cournot. All these results are consistent with the industrial organi-
zation theory.
However, when a real market is introduced to the model as in Wang et al.
(2009), i.e. when real decisions are made endogenously, Stackelberg compe-
tition among the insiders does not always decrease the follower’s (manager)
profits when compared to Daher and Mirman (2006), where Cournot com-
petition is introduced in both the real and financial markets. 9
Second, Stackelberg competition among the insiders increases the amount
of information revealed in the stock price compared to the Cournot case. To
understand this result better, recall the expression of the total order flow
signal,
r˜ = β + γz˜ + u˜, (19)
where the noise term u˜, in the total order flow signal is homoscedastic10 (see
equation 19). Hence, the greater the deterministic part γ of the total order
flow signal, the more informative is the total order flow signal. Adding a
second informed trader to Jain and Mirman (1999) (i.e, model I ) or intro-
ducing Stackelberg competition between the two informed traders (model
II), changes the values of the deterministic part of the total order flow sig-
nal. Since, the noise term (ε˜) in noise signal (q˜ = z˜ + ε˜) is heteroscedastic
and multiplicative, any change in the financial market structure affects only
the total order flow signal. Thus, such change alters the market makers’
information about z only through the total order flow signal.
9See Wang el al (2009) page 129, Proposition 4.
10See Creane (1993).
10
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Comparing the total order flow signal coefficients of model I and II, we find
that γ in model II is greater than γ in model I.11 Consequently, adding Stack-
elberg competition in the financial sector increases the level of information
incorporated in the stock price set by the market makers with respect to the
Cournot case.
Finally, note that both types of competitions (Cournot or Stackelberg) in the
financial market alter the stock price coefficients. We have already shown
that Stackelberg competition in the financial market leads to a wider dis-
semination of information through the stock price with respect to Cournot
competition. This explains the lower value of the stock price noise signal µ1
in Stackelberg than in Cournot. Moreover, due to the negative relationship
between the noise signal coefficient µ1 and the intercept coefficient µ0 (which
results from the zero expected profits of the market maker), we infer that
the value of µ0 in Stackelberg is greater than in Cournot.
Note also that the order flow signal coefficient µ2 depends on the exogenous
variances of the model. Lemma 3 shows that when the noise signal is rel-
atively noisy, the total order flow coefficient of the stock price is greater in
Stackelberg than in Cournot. This result is due to the fact that in the case
of a noisy signal, the market maker only extracts information from the total
order flow signal. To highlight the relationship between the value of µ2, the
exogenous variance, the market structure and the number of insiders, recall
that the noise signal is heteroscedastic and multiplicative and given by
q˜ = z˜ + ε˜
It should be pointed out that this signal can not be manipulated by the
insiders. In other words, competition (Cournot or Stackelberg) among the
insiders in the financial market, does not alter the coefficient of the noise
term (it is always equal to one). Thus, the market maker extracts the same
information from the noise signal regardless the competition structure in the
financial market. However, introducing competition in the financial market,
alters the deterministic part γ, of the total order flow signal (see equation
19).
From equation 18, the variance of the stock value σ2z and the variance of
the noise signal σ2ε are the determinants of the effect of the competition
structure on the total order flow response µ2. When σ
2
z is relatively small
with respect to σ2ε , the total order flow signal becomes more relevant to the
market maker than the noisy signal. Thus, the value of µ2 in the presence
of Stackelberg competition is greater than the value of µ2 in the presence
11Indeed, from Proposition 1, we infer that x˜M1 = x˜M11 + x˜
M1
2 =
√
2σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯) while
Proposition 2 shows that x˜M2 = x˜M21 + x˜
M2
2 =
√
3σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯).
11
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of Cournot. However, when both signals provide relevant information to
the market maker, the zero profit condition makes the value of µ2 in the
Stackelberg case lower than the value of µ2 in Cournot.
Now, we turn to the role of information sources in the Stackelberg case. In
other words, we study the effects of information efficiency when the market
maker observes two correlated signals instead of the total order flow signal
alone. For this purpose, we present the benchmark model which is iden-
tical to our model except that the market maker only observes the total
order flow signal. In other words, the benchmark model studies Stackel-
berg competition among the insiders in the Kyle-type models. Proposition
3 whose proof is omitted, characterizes the unique linear equilibrium of the
benchmark model.
Proposition 3 In the Stackelberg model with one signal (the total order
flow), a linear equilibrium exists and is unique. It is characterized as follows
x˜1 =
(z˜ − z¯)
4µ1
, x˜2 =
(z˜ − z¯)
2µ1
(20)
µ0 = z¯, µ1 =
√
3σz
4σu
, p˜ = µ0 + µ1r˜ (21)
V ar(z˜|r˜) = 1
4
σ2z (22)
pi1(z˜) =
σu(z˜ − z¯)2
4
√
3σz
, pi2(z˜) =
σu(z˜ − z¯)2
2
√
3σz
(23)
A simple comparison between Propositions 2 and 3 shows that adding a
signal that is correlated with the value of the asset and that can not be ma-
nipulated by the insiders, increases the amount of information revealed by
the stock price. However, the additional signal does not affect the trading
strategies of each insider. In other words, with one or two signals, each in-
sider i trades the same quantity x˜i (i = 1, 2). Moreover, adding a correlated
signal to the informational structure always decreases the insiders’ profits.
4 Model III : Monopoly in the real market
In this section, we study the effect of introducing decisions in the real sector
on the results of model II, i.e., model III studies Stackelberg competition in
the financial sector and monopoly in the real sector. It adds a real sector
to model II and hence allows us to study the effect of the real market on
equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we consider an economy with one real
12
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good and one financial asset. The real good is produced by a monopolistic
firm at no cost. The inverse demand function is linear and stochastic, i.e.,
q′ = (a− by)z˜ a, b > 0 (24)
where a and b are positive constants and z˜ is a random variable, normally
distributed with mean z¯ (assumed positive) and variance σ2z . The stock of
the firm is publicly traded in a competitive financial market. The value
of the stock is the net profits of the firm per share. We assume that the
manager and the owner of the firm are the two insiders who trade in the
stock market based on their inside information. Moreover the owner has
no managerial responsibilities. As in the previous models, we suppose that
there exist noise traders whose aggregate demand is denoted by the random
variable u˜ with mean 0 and variance σ2u. We follow Jain and Mirman (2000)
by allowing the market makers to observe two signals. The first, from the
real market, is denoted by q˜ = (a − by)(z˜ + ε˜) where ε˜ is normally dis-
tributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε . The second is the total order flow,
i.e., r˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 + u˜ where x˜1 and x˜2 are the manager’s and the owner’s
trading orders, respectively.
Each insider knows only the realization z of z˜ and does not know the values
of u˜, ε˜, r˜, z˜ + ε˜ before his order flow decisions are made. Moreover, neither
market maker knows the realization z of z˜ but both knows its distribution.
Finally, the market makers cannot observe either xi, u or ε.
The value per share of the firm is the net profit of the firm per share, i.e.,
v′ = (a− by)yz˜ a, b > 0 (25)
and the profit of the manager and the owner are respectively
ψ1 = (v
′ −A− p˜)x˜1 +Ax˜1 (26)
ψ2 = (v
′ −A− p˜)x˜2 (27)
where A is the manager’s compensation scheme.12 We assume as in model
II and Wang et al. (2009), that the owner moves first because he knows
the manager’s reaction function before making any decision. Proposition
4 characterizes the unique linear equilibrium, the amount of information
revealed by the stock price and the conditional expected profits of the two
insiders.
12Following Jain and Mirman (2000), the existence of such compensation scheme is to
ensure the second order condition of the manager’s maximization problem. For more
details, see Jain and Mirman (2000) and the extended works thereafter.
13
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Proposition 4 In the insider trading Stackelberg model with a monopoly
structure in the real market, a linear equilibrium exists and is unique. It is
characterized by
y =
a+ µ1b
2b
x˜1 =
(a− by)(y − µ1)z˜
4µ2
, x˜2 =
(a− by)(y − µ1)(z˜ − z¯)
2µ2
(28)
µ0 = 2A =
(a− by)(y − µ1)z¯
2
, µ1 =
aσ2z
b(σ2z + 8σ
2
ε)
=
a
b
k, (29)
µ2 =
a2
√
3σε
√
(1− k)3k
4
√
2bσu
, k =
σ2z
σ2z + 8σ
2
ε
(30)
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 4σ
2
ε
σ2z (31)
pi1(z˜) =
4a2σuσ
4
εz
2
b
√
3σz(σ2z + 8σ
2
ε)
, pi2(z˜) =
8a2σuσ
4
ε(z − z¯)2
b
√
3σz(σ2z + 8σ
2
ε)
(32)
Proof: See Appendix C
The relationship between the two models, II and III, is similar to the re-
lationship between Jain and Mirman (1999) and Jain and Mirman (2000).
Indeed, Jain and Mirman (2000) added a real market to Jain and Mirman
(1999) and investigated the effect of making decisions in the real market on
the equilibrium outcomes. They found that several variables are affected by
the real market structure. Specifically, in equilibrium, the order strategy of
the owner and the amount of information revealed are both independent of
the real market structure.
We obtain similar results. First, the conditional variances in both models I
and II are the same. In other words, introducing a real market in model II
has no effect on information revelation. This is due to the non-randomness
of the real output variable (y).
Second, simplifying the expression of the order strategy of the two owners
in both models I and II (see equations 11 and 28), we obtain
x˜2 =
2σu(z˜ − z¯)√
3σz
(33)
Hence, the owner’s strategy is independent of the real market structure.
14
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Note that, the introduction of the compensation scheme, decreases the man-
ager’s strategy compared with model II.13 Moreover, it should de pointed
out that going from one signal to two signal does not alter the insiders’
strategies.
We analyze the effect of the real market structure on the equilibrium out-
comes, i.e., we compare model III to Wang et al (2009) who modeled Stack-
elberg competition in the financial market with Cournot competition in the
real market. Formally,
Lemma 3 The differences between model III and Wang et al (2009) in
terms of impact on the equilibrium outcomes are given by, 14
µ0 > µ
WWR
0 , µ1 > µ
WWR
1 , µ2 > µ
WWR
2 , (34)
y1 > y
WWR
1 , y1 < Y
WWR, A > AWWR (35)
x˜1 = x˜
WWR
1 , x˜2 = x˜
WWR
2 , V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)WWR (36)
pi1 > pi
WWR
1 , pi2 > pi
WWR
2 (37)
Lemma 3 shows the effect of the real market structure on equilibrium out-
comes in the presence of Stackelberg competition in the financial sector.
The relationship between this model and Wang et al (2009) is similar to
the relationship that exists between Daher and Mirman (2006) and (2007).
Indeed, Daher and Mirman (2007) studied Cournot competition in the fi-
nancial sector in the presence of a monopoly structure in the real sector
while Daher and Mirman (2006) studied Cournot competition in both sides
of the market, i.e. they added another competing firm in the real sector to
Daher and Mirman (2007).
Cournot competition in the real sector generates no new information when
compared to the monopoly case. This is due to the randomness of the real
output variables in both the monopoly and duopoly case. Moreover compe-
tition in the real sector does not affect the trading strategy of the insiders.
Jain and Mirman (2002) who studied Cournot competition in the real sector
and monopoly in the financial market, obtained the same results compared
13In model II, the manager’s strategy is an affine function while in our model it is a
linear function passing through the origin.
14The superscript WWR refers to Wang et al (2009).
15
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to Jain and Mirman(2000) who modeled a monopoly in both the real and
financial market. Similarly, Daher and Mirman (2006) studied a Cournot
competition in both the real and financial markets. They showed that the
insiders’ trades, as well as the information revealed are not affected by the
real market structure compared to the monopoly case in the real market
studied by Daher and Mirman (2007).
Second, Cournot competition in the real market decreases the profits of the
firm with respect to the monopoly case. Such a decrease in profits must be
incorporated into the stock price function of the market makers. This ex-
plains the lower values of the price coefficients in Wang el al (2009) compared
to model III. Also, the compensation scheme is affected by the monopoly
structure in the real sector. Since the value of the compensation scheme is
half the value of µ0, we deduce that the compensation scheme is greater in
this model. In sum, competition in the real sector reduces the unconditional
expected value of firm 1 and, thus, the coefficients of the stock price signals
are less with the presence of Cournot competition in the real sector than in
the monopoly case.
Finally, in the line with the industrial organization theory, we find that the
amount of output produced in the monopoly case is less than in the Cournot
case studied in Wang et al. (2009). We also find that the insiders’ profits
under Cournot duopoly are less than those under monopoly . It should be
pointed out that these results also hold in Jain and Mirman (2002) which
studied Cournot competition in the real sector and monopoly in the financial
market when compared to Jain and Mirman(2000) which modeled monopoly
in both the real and financial market. Similarly, Daher and Mirman (2006)
when studying Cournot competition in both the real and financial markets,
obtained the same results as compared to the monopoly case in the real
market studied by Daher and Mirman (2007).
Appendix
In this appendix we recall the Theorem that we use to prove all the results
in the three cases of the paper.
Theorem 1 If the p× 1 vector Y is normally distributed with mean U and
covariance V and if the vector Y is partitioned into two subvectors such that
Y =
(
Y1
Y2
)
and if Y ∗ =
(
Y1
Y ∗2
)
U =
(
U1
U2
)
and V =
(
V11 V12
V21 V22
)
16
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are the corresponding partitions of Y ∗,U and V, then the conditional dis-
tribution of the m × 1 (m < p) vector Y1 given the vector Y2 = Y ∗2 is the
multivariate normal distribution with mean U1 + V12V
−1
22 (Y
∗
2 - U2) and co-
variance matrix V11 − V12V −122 V21.
Proof : See Graybill, Theorem 3.10 pp 63.
Appendix A: proof of Proposition 1
First note, in the Cournot case the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. x˜1 = x˜2.
Taking the first and the second order conditions of the insider maximization
problem (equation 1), we find
x˜1 = x˜2 =
(1− µ1)(z˜ − µ0)
3µ2
(38)
and µ2 > 0. Substituting the expression of µ0 = z¯−µ1q¯−µ2r¯ into equation
(38), we obtain the insiders strategies in (4). Now, applying Theorem 1
to the normal random vector B = (z˜, q˜, r˜) with p = 3 and m = 1. By
identification, we have Y1 = z˜ and Y2 =
(
q˜
r˜
)
. U1 = z¯, U2 =
(
q¯
r¯
)
and
V =
 σ2z σzq σzrσzq σ2q σqr
σzr σqr σ
2
r
 = ( V11 V12
V21 V22
)
Where V11 = σ
2
z , V12 = (σzq, σzr), V21 =
(
σzq
σzr
)
and V22 =
(
σ2q σqr
σqr σ
2
r
)
.
Note that
V −122 =
1
D
(
σ2r −σqr
−σqr σ2q
)
,
where D is the determinant of V22, that is D = σ
2
qσ
2
r − σ2qr.
µ1 =
σzqσ
2
r − σzrσqr
D
(39)
µ2 =
σzrσ
2
q − σvqσqr
D
(40)
Substituting the corresponding values for the variances and covariances, we
find
µ1 =
σ2zσ
2
u
D
(41)
17
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µ2 =
2(1− µ1)σ2zσ2ε
3µ2D
(42)
Combining equations (41) and (42) we obtain
3µ22 =
2(1− µ1)µ1σ2ε
σ2u
(43)
Now computing for the expression of D, one can find that
3µ22D =
4(1− µ1)2σ2zσ2ε
3
+ 3µ22σ
2
u(σ
2
z + σ
2
ε) (44)
Arranging for (42) and (44), we obtain
3µ22 =
2(1− µ1)(1 + 2µ1)σ2zσ2ε
3σ2u(σ
2
z + σ
2
ε)
(45)
Solving for (43) and (45) we obtain
µ1 =
σ2z
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
(46)
Plugging (46) into (43) we obtain the expression of µ2 in (5). Applying
Theorem 1 to compute the conditional variance we find that
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ2z − µ1σzq − µ2σzr
=
σ2ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z
Finally, substituting the values of x˜i, µ1 and µ2, we find the expression of
the insiders conditional profits in (7) 2
Appendix B: proof of Proposition 2
In this appendix, the main change with respect to appendix A is the re-
action curves derivation of each insider. The remainder is similar and thus
omitted. Indeed, following Stackelberg structure, the manager moves second
and hence his reaction curve is given by
x˜1 =
z − µ0 − µ1z − µ2x˜1
2µ2
(47)
Now plugging (47) into the profit function of the owner and taking the first
order condition we find,
18
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x˜2 =
z − µ0 − µ1z
2µ2
(48)
which implies that
x˜1 =
z − µ0 − µ1z
4µ2
(49)
2
Appendix C: proof of Proposition 4
First note that the value of the firm is now v˜ and thus adjusting Theorem
1 with this new information and using structures detailed in appendices A
and B, we derive equations (28) and (29). Second, the conditional variance
becomes
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ2z −
µ1
(a− by)yσzq −
µ2
(a− by)yσzr
and equation (31) follows. Finally, equation (32) follows automatically after
submitting all the required expressions. 2
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